Adam Air Flight #574 Crash Investigation -- #English

Air Crash Investigation: Adam Air
Adam Air flight 574
· Adam Air Flight 574
Dated January 1, 2007 (2007-01)
· Type: Pilot error / inertial navigation system damage
· Site off: Majene Makassar Strait, Sulawesi, Indonesia. Black box at 03 ° 41'02 "E 118 ° 08'53 S" / 3.68389 ° S 118.14806 ° E / -3.68389; 118.14806 and 03 ° 40'22 "S 118 ° 09'16 "E / 3.67278 ° S 118.15444 ° E / -3.67278; 118.15444
· Capacity: 96
· Crew: 6
· Deaths: 102 (all)
· Victims: 0 (none)
· Aircraft type: Boeing 737-4Q8
· Operator: Adam Air
· Number plane: PK-KKW
· Flight Origin: Juanda International Airport
· Airport: Sam Ratulangi Objectives

Adam Air Flight 574 (KI-574) were passengers of domestic flights operated by Adam Air between the cities of Indonesia Surabaya (SUB) and Manado (MDC) lost near Polewali in Sulawesi on January 1, 2007. The plane, a Boeing 737-4Q8 a finally determined to fall into the sea, from a few small pieces of wreckage have been found. Flight recorders ("black box") is lifted from the sea on August 28, 2007, while rescue efforts for some of the larger piece of the wreckage continues dilanjutan. All 102 passengers died. This is the highest mortality rate of any aviation accident involving a Boeing 737-400. A national investigation be launched into the disaster, expressed some concerns about the airline's overall maintenance, including a large number of aircraft. Another possibility raised by the family of a deceased is that the accident was due to a faulty steering valve, which is known to have caused accidents and incidents before the Boeing 737. The location of the debris has indicated that the aircraft was probably hit the ocean intact. The final report, released on March 25, 2008, concluded that the pilot lost control of the aircraft after they become preoccupied with the problem of inertial reference system and accidentally decided autopilot.


Boeing 737-4Q8 aircraft, registered PK-KKW, created in 1990. Prior to service with the Adam Air plane was flying over the seven other airlines: Dan-Air, British Airways, GB Airways, National Jets Italy, WFBN, Air One, and Jat Airways, carrying four different registration numbers, including the PK-KKW. The plane flew 45 371 hours and evaluated and declared airworthy by the Department of Transportation Indonesia on December 25, 2005.

On January 1, 2007, at 12:55 local time (05:55 UTC), the aircraft departed from Juanda Airport, Surabaya, with 96 passengers (85 adults, 7 children and 4 infants) and six crew members. Passenger list consists mainly of citizens of Indonesia, strangers there is only an American family of three. Two-hour flight, scheduled to arrive at Sam Ratulangi Airport, Manado, at 16: 00 local time, the plane disappeared from radar screens of air traffic control in Makassar, South Sulawesi, with the last contact at 14:53 local time (06:53 UTC) . Last known position of the signal detected by a Singapore satellite's altitude is shown as 35,000 feet (10 670 m) on the radar screen.

Weather in the area is quite bad. Indonesia Meteorological and Geophysical Bureau noted that the thickness of the clouds up to 30,000 feet (9140 m) in height and average wind speed of 30 knots (56 km / h). Although Juanda Airport operator, PT Angkasa Pura I, has given warning to the pilot about the weather, the plane still left on schedule. The plane hit the crosswinds of more than 70 knots (130 km / h) over the Makassar Strait, west of Sulawesi, where it turns east toward the ground before losing contact. In the last radio transmission, the pilot reported crosswinds from the left, but the air traffic control that the wind should come from the right. It is not known whether this is significant to the accident, but may indicate a navigational error, or an emergency turn-around the aircraft.

Contrary to initial reports, there is no call for help sent by the aircraft. Initial reports indicate that the plane had been found in the mountains of Sulawesi, about 20 kilometers (12 miles) from Polewali town and that there were 12 victims. But the team found no sign of wreckage at the accident site reported. On January 2, 2007, Minister of Indonesia said that the transportation safety of the aircraft has not been found and reports to the contrary are based on a false rumor of the local villagers passed on to local officials.


On the day Monday, January 8, three large metal object, believed to be the ruins, was detected by sonar vessel KRI Fatahillah's Indonesia. First Admiral Gatot Subyanto Navy Indonesia showed three sites, between 3-6 km (2-4 miles) apart, from the west coast town of Mamuju in Sulawesi. Due to the limitations of naval sonar equipment, it is not clear what it is metal, and Indonesia do not have other equipment itself. U.S. Navy ship, the USNS Mary Sears, arrived in the area on January 9, with better equipment to help identify the object, and on the same jet Canada with five separate air crews, who work in shifts, was sent to assist the mapping of air the location of the suspect. Indonesia and the Marine. Ministry of Fisheries recommends that metallic objects can not be deployed tool to study the underwater ocean currents. Amount of twelve Indonesian Navy ships deployed in the region, including the KRI Invite, KRI KRI Leuser and Nala. Extra underwater equipment, including metal detectors and underwater cameras, shipped from the United States, and arrived on board the USNS Mary Sears on January 17. The black box is then to be somewhere else, in the waters in an area. known as Majene, and search, the broad sweep of the area shows a high amount of debris scattered in there as well. debris was analyzed to confirm it's 737.

The aircraft's right horizontal stabilizer was found by a fisherman, to the south Pare Pare, about 300 meters (984 feet) off the coast on January 11. Initially, the fisherman thought that temuanya it is part of the plywood, but then he realized it was the tail. This is confirmed by the serial number on the stabilizer, 65 25 746 C 76, which matches the component in the 737 missing. Fishermen receive a prize of 50 million rupiah (equivalent to about $ 5,500) for his discovery. Later, other parts of the aircraft, including passenger seats, life jackets, food trays, parts of aircraft tires, eight pieces of aluminum and fiber, ID cards, flares and a backrest also been found in the area. On January 13, a piece of the wing were also found. It is unclear whether the object along the 1.5 meter (4.9 feet) is part of the right wing or left wing.

On January 21, the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR), or better known as black boxes, which lies off the coast of West Sulawesi was discovered by the U.S. ship Mary Sears. Flight data recorder is located at 03 ° 41'02 "S 118 ° 08'53" E / 3.68389 ° S 118.14806 ° E / -3.68389; 118.14806 at a depth of 2,000 meters (6600 feet), while the recorder cockpit voice situated in 03 ° 40 '22 "S 118 ° 09'16" E / 3.67278 ° S 118.15444 ° E / -3.67278; 118.15444 at a depth of 1,900 meters (6200 feet). This position suggests that a separate black box about 1.4 km (0.9 miles). Indonesia Fatahillah ship went to the scene, while Mary Sears traveled to Singapore, arriving on January 29 to return the equipment used to locate the detector.


On 26 January, held a meeting and the government of Indonesia Adam Air-making process regarding the black box. Because of the depth involved, their extraction requires a remotely operated vehicle underwater, but because of the cost recovery method, mainly because such equipment is required to be sent from other places, the government put the responsibility for recovering the cost of recording the Adam Air.


On May 28, Adam Air announced that it has signed a contract with Phoenix International, with the original plan for the recovery occurred in June. On August 23, EAS arriving at the port of Makassar, Sulawesi, to begin the retrieval operation, which began with a survey a few days. The ship carrying a mini submarine that can dive to 6,000 meters (20,000 feet), and is equipped with sonar and deep-sea camera.

Black boxes were sent to Washington for analysis, there are fears that the investigation could fail because the data damage caused by long immersion. The final cost of the rescue operation to retrieve the black box is U.S. $ 3 million, two million donated by the government of Indonesia, with Adam Air to pay the rest.

A team from the United States with representatives from the National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing and General Electric were sent to Indonesia to assist the Indonesian National Committee for Transportation in the investigation. Patrick Smith, an airline based pilot and aviation commentator. has said that "What happened to the plane, it was likely rapid and catastrophic," he said, and that there was an explosion on-board or metal fatigue caused by structural failure is the most likely cause of the accident.

On March 25, 2008, the investigation determined that pilot error and faulty navigation equipment was the cause of the crash. While at 35,000 feet (10 668 m), the pilot was busy with the problem of two aircraft inertial reference systems (IRS), part of the navigation system. Becomes disconnected the autopilot and the pilot failed to correct a slow right roll even after the bank angle, the alarm sounds. Although the bank angle reaches 100 ° to nearly 60 ° nose down, the pilot did not boost the wings before attempting to regain control of pitch. the aircraft reached 490 knots at the end of the tape, which exceeds the maximum rated speed of the aircraft to dive (400 knots). This aircraft suffered structural failure 20 seconds before the end of the tape.

Investigasi Adam Air Flight #574

Air Crash Investigation : Adam Air

Adam Air penerbangan 574

·    Adam Air Penerbangan 574
Tanggal 1 Januari 2007 (2007-01)

·         Jenis                :Pilot error / kerusakan sistem navigasi inersial

·         Situs off           :Majene Selat Makassar, Sulawesi, Indonesia. Kotak hitam di 03 ° 41'02 "E 118 ° 08'53 S" / 3,68389 ° S 118,14806 ° E / -3,68389; 118,14806 dan 03 ° 40'22 "S 118 ° 09'16" E / 3,67278 ° S 118,15444 ° E / -3,67278; 118,15444

·         Penumpang      :96

·         Crew               :6

·         Kematian         :102 (semua)

·         Korban            :0 (none)

·         Pesawat jenis   :Boeing 737-4Q8

·         Operator          :Adam Air

·         Nomor pesawat: PK-KKW

·         Asal Penerbangan  : Bandara Internasional Juanda

·         Bandar Udara   :Sam Ratulangi Tujuan

Adam Air Penerbangan 574 (KI-574) adalah penumpang penerbangan domestik yang dioperasikan oleh Adam Air antara kota-kota Indonesia Surabaya (SUB) dan Manado (MDC)  yang hilang dekat Polewali di Sulawesi pada tanggal 1 Januari 2007. Pesawat yang berupa sebuah Boeing 737-4Q8, akhirnya ditentukan jatuh ke laut, dari beberapa potongan kecil dari rongsokan telah ditemukan. Perekam Penerbangan ("kotak hitam") diangkat dari laut pada 28 Agustus 2007, sementara upaya penyelamatan untuk beberapa potongan yang lebih besar dari rongsokan terus dilanjutan. Semua 102 penumpang meninggal. Ini adalah angka kematian tertinggi dari setiap kecelakaan penerbangan yang melibatkan sebuah Boeing 737-400. Sebuah penyelidikan nasional segera diluncurkan ke bencana, mengungkapkan beberapa masalah mengenai maskapai pemeliharaan secara keseluruhan, termasuk sejumlah besar tentang pesawat. Kemungkinan lain yang diajukan oleh keluarga dari beberapa almarhum adalah bahwa kecelakaan itu karena kemudi katup yang rusak, yang diketahui telah menyebabkan kecelakaan dan insiden sebelumnya Boeing 737. Lokasi dari puing telah mengindikasikan bahwa pesawat itu mungkin melanda laut utuh. Laporan akhir, dirilis pada 25 Maret 2008, menyimpulkan bahwa pilot kehilangan kendali atas pesawat setelah mereka menjadi sibuk dengan masalah sistem rujukan inersia dan secara tidak sengaja memutuskan autopilot.


Pesawat Boeing 737-4Q8, registrasi PK-KKW, dibuat pada tahun 1990. Sebelum layanan dengan Adam Air, pesawat itu terbang selama tujuh maskapai lainnya: Dan-Air, Inggris Airways, GB Airways, National Jets Italia, WFBN, Air One, dan Jat Airways, tercatat empat nomor pendaftaran yang berbeda, termasuk PK-KKW. Pesawat itu terbang dan 45.371 jam terakhir dievaluasi dan dinyatakan layak terbang oleh Departemen Perhubungan Indonesia pada tanggal 25 Desember 2005.

Pada tanggal 1 Januari 2007, pukul 12:55 waktu setempat (05:55 UTC), pesawat berangkat dari Bandara Juanda, Surabaya, dengan 96 penumpang (85 dewasa, 7 anak-anak dan 4 bayi) dan enam awak kapal. Daftar penumpang terutama terdiri dari warga negara Indonesia, orang asing hanya ada sebuah keluarga Amerika dari tiga. Penerbangan dua jam, dijadwalkan tiba di Bandara Sam Ratulangi, Manado, pada 16 : 00 waktu setempat, pesawat menghilang dari layar radar kontrol lalu lintas udara di Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan, dengan kontak terakhir pada 14:53 waktu setempat (06:53 UTC). Posisi sinyal terakhir diketahui terdeteksi oleh satelit Singapura ketinggian pesawat ditunjukkan sebagai 35.000 kaki (10.670 m) pada layar radar.

Cuaca di daerah itu cukup buruk. Biro Indonesia Meteorologi dan Geofisika mencatat bahwa ketebalan awan naik sampai 30.000 kaki (9.140 m) tingginya dan kecepatan angin rata-rata 30 knot (56 km / h). Meskipun operator Bandara Juanda, PT Angkasa Pura I, telah memberikan peringatan kepada pilot mengenai kondisi cuaca, pesawat tetap berangkat sesuai jadwal. Pesawat menabrak crosswinds lebih dari 70 knot (130 km / h) di atas Selat Makassar, sebelah barat Sulawesi, di mana ia mengubah arah timur menuju tanah sebelum kehilangan kontak. Pada transmisi radio terakhir, pilot melaporkan adanya crosswinds datang dari sebelah kiri, tapi kontrol lalu lintas udara menyatakan bahwa angin harus datang dari kanan. Hal ini belum diketahui apakah ini signifikan terhadap kecelakaan itu, tetapi mungkin menunjukkan kesalahan navigasi, atau keadaan darurat gilirannya-di sekitar pesawat.

Bertentangan dengan laporan awal, tidak ada panggilan untuk membantu dikirim oleh pesawat. Laporan awal menunjukkan bahwa pesawat telah ditemukan di wilayah pegunungan di Sulawesi sekitar 20 kilometer (12 mil) dari kota Polewali dan bahwa ada 12 korban. Namun tim tidak menemukan tanda dari rongsokan pesawat di lokasi kecelakaan yang dilaporkan. Pada tanggal 2 Januari 2007, Menteri keselamatan transportasi Indonesia mengatakan bahwa pesawat belum ditemukan dan laporan yang bertentangan dengan itu didasarkan pada desas-desus palsu dari penduduk desa setempat diteruskan kepada petugas setempat.

Pada hari Senin, 8 Januari, tiga benda logam besar, yang diduga menjadi reruntuhan, terdeteksi oleh sonar kapal KRI Fatahillah's Indonesia. Laksamana Pertama Gatot Subyanto Angkatan Laut Indonesia menunjukkan tiga lokasi, antara 3-6 km ( 2-4 mil) terpisah, dari kota Mamuju di pantai barat Sulawesi. Karena keterbatasan peralatan sonar angkatan laut, maka tidak jelas logam apa itu, dan Indonesia tidak memiliki peralatan lainnya sendiri. Kapal AL Amerika, USNS Mary Sears, tiba di daerah tersebut pada tanggal 9 Januari dengan peralatan yang lebih baik untuk membantu mengidentifikasi objek, dan pada tanggal yang sama jet Kanada dengan lima awak udara yang terpisah, yang bekerja di shift, dikirim untuk membantu pemetaan udara dengan lokasi yang dicurigai. Marine Indonesia dan. Perikanan Departemen menyarankan bahwa benda logam bukan bisa menjadi alat dikerahkan untuk mempelajari arus bawah air laut. Jumlah dari dua belas kapal Angkatan Laut Indonesia dikerahkan di wilayah tersebut, termasuk KRI Ajak, KRI Leuser dan KRI Nala. Extra peralatan bawah air, termasuk detektor logam dan kamera bawah laut, dikirim dari Amerika Serikat, dan tiba di atas kapal USNS Mary Sears pada 17 Januari. Kotak hitam itu kemudian berada di tempat lain, di perairan di suatu daerah. dikenal sebagai Majene, dan penggeledahan, menyapu luas kawasan menunjukkan jumlah yang tinggi puing-puing berserakan di sana juga. puing ini dianalisis untuk mengkonfirmasikannya milik 737.

Stabilizer kanan horisontal Pesawat itu ditemukan oleh nelayan, di selatannya Pare Pare, sekitar 300 meter (984 kaki) lepas pantai pada tanggal 11 Januari. Awalnya, nelayan itu berpikir bahwa temuanya itu merupakan bagian dari kayu lapis, tetapi kemudian ia menyadari itu adalah bagian ekor. Hal ini diperkuat oleh nomor seri pada stabilizer, 65 25.746 C 76, yang cocok dengan komponen di 737 hilang. Nelayan menerima hadiah sebesar 50 juta rupiah (setara dengan sekitar $ 5.500) untuk penemuannya. Kemudian, bagian lain dari pesawat, termasuk kursi penumpang, jaket, nampan makanan, bagian dari ban pesawat, delapan buah dari aluminium dan serat, kartu ID, suar dan sebuah sandaran juga telah ditemukan di daerah tersebut. Pada 13 Januari, sepotong sayap juga ditemukan.  Tidak jelas apakah benda sepanjang 1,5 meter (4.9 kaki) itu adalah bagian dari sayap kanan atau sayap kiri.

Pada tanggal 21 Januari, perekam data penerbangan (FDR) dan perekam suara kokpit (CVR), atau yang lebih dikenal dengan kotak hitam, yang terletak di lepas pantai Sulawesi Barat ditemukan oleh kapal AS Mary Sears. Perekam data penerbangan terletak di 03 ° 41'02 "S 118 ° 08'53" E / 3,68389 ° S 118,14806 ° E / -3,68389; 118,14806 pada kedalaman 2.000 meter (6.600 kaki), sedangkan perekam suara kokpit terletak di 03 ° 40 '22 "S 118 ° 09'16" E / 3,67278 ° S 118,15444 ° E / -3,67278; 118,15444 pada kedalaman 1.900 meter (6.200 kaki). Posisi ini menunjukkan kotak hitam itu terpisah sekitar 1,4 km (0.9 mil). Kapal Indonesia Fatahillah pergi ke lokasi, sementara Mary Sears melakukan perjalanan ke Singapura, tiba pada 29 Januari untuk mengembalikan peralatan detektor digunakan untuk mencari perangkat.

Pada tanggal 26 Januari, diadakan pertemuan Adam Air dan pemerintah Indonesia mengenai proses pengambilan kotak hitam. Karena kedalaman yang terlibat, pengambilannya diperlukan suatu kendaraan jarak jauh yang dioperasikan di bawah air, tetapi karena biaya menggunakan metode pemulihan-terutama karena peralatan seperti yang dibutuhkan untuk dikirim dari tempat lain-pemerintah menempatkan tanggung jawab untuk biaya memulihkan perekam pada Adam Air.


Pada tanggal 28 Mei, Adam Air mengumumkan bahwa mereka telah menandatangani kontrak dengan Phoenix internasional, dengan rencana asli yang untuk pemulihan terjadi pada bulan Juni. Pada tanggal 23 Agustus, EAS tiba di pelabuhan Makassar, Sulawesi untuk memulai operasi pengambilan, yang dimulai dengan survei beberapa hari. Kapal membawa kapal selam mini yang dapat menyelam hingga 6.000 meter (20.000 kaki), dan dilengkapi dengan sonar dan kamera laut dalam.

Kotak-kotak hitam dikirim ke Washington untuk analisa, ada ketakutan bahwa upaya penyelidikan bisa gagal karena data kerusakan yang disebabkan oleh lama perendaman. Biaya akhir operasi penyelamatan untuk mengambil kotak hitam adalah sebesar US $ 3 juta, yang dua juta disumbangkan oleh pemerintah Indonesia, dengan Adam Air membayar sisanya.

Sebuah tim dari Amerika Serikat dengan wakil-wakil dari Dewan Keselamatan Transportasi Nasional, Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing dan General Electric dikirim ke Indonesia untuk membantu Komite Nasional Indonesia untuk Transportasi dalam penyelidikan. Patrick Smith, seorang pilot maskapai penerbangan yang berbasis dan komentator penerbangan,. telah mengatakan bahwa "Apa yang terjadi dengan pesawat, ia kemungkinan cepat dan bencana," katanya dan bahwa ada ledakan on-board atau kelelahan logam yang disebabkan kegagalan struktural adalah penyebab paling mungkin dari kecelakaan itu.

Pada tanggal 25 Maret 2008, penyelidikan memutuskan bahwa kesalahan pilot dan alat navigasi rusak adalah penyebab jatuhnya pesawat itu. Sementara pada 35.000 kaki (10.668 m), pilot sibuk dengan masalah dua pesawat sistem acuan inersia (IRS ), bagian dari sistem navigasi. Autopilot menjadi terlepas dan pilot gagal untuk mengoreksi gulungan hak lambat bahkan setelah bank angle, alarm berbunyi. Meskipun bank mencapai sudut 100 ° dengan hampir 60 ° hidung ke bawah, para pilot tidak menigkatkan sayap sebelum mencoba untuk mendapatkan kembali kontrol pitch. pesawat mencapai 490 knot pada akhir rekaman, yang melebihi kecepatan maksimum rate pesawat untuk menyelam (400 knot). Pesawat ini mengalami kegagalan struktur 20 detik sebelum akhir rekaman.

The Tenerife crash - March 27th, 1977

Here are the CVR's transcript :

March 27, 1977
Tenerife, Canary Islands
Pan American,  Flight 1736 / KLM, Flight 4805
Boeing B-747-121 / Boeing B-747-206B
N736PA / PH-BUF

Both aircraft were diverted to Tenerife because of a bombing at Las Palmas Airport. After an
extended delay, both planes were instructed to back track up the runway. The KLM plane
reached its takeoff point while the Pan Am plane was still on the runway. The Pan Am plane
continued up the runway missing the taxiway turnout. There was heavy fog on the runway.
The KLM plane began its takeoff roll without permission with the Pan Am plane still on the
runway. The KLM plane hit the Pan Am plane just as it was taking off. Both planes burst into
flames. KLM 234 + 14 crew, Pan Am 326 + 9 crew killed.

PA RT = Radio Transmission Pan Am First Officer
APP = Tenerife tower
PA CAM 1 = Cockpit Area Mike PanAm, Captain
PA CAM 2 = Cockpit Area Mike PanAm,  First Officer
PA CAM 3 = Cockpit Area Mike PanAm,  Flight Engineer
KLM RT = KLM Radio Transmission
KLM CAM 1 = KLM cockpit Area Mike, Captain
KLM CAM 2 = KLM cockpit Area Mike, First Officer
KLM CAM 3 = KLM cockpit Area Mike, Flight Engineer
?? = Unknown

1701:57.0	PA RT	Tenerife the Clipper one seven three six.
1702:01.8	APP	Clipper one seven three six Tenerife.
1702:03.6	PA RT	Ah- We were instructed to contact you and also to taxi down the runway, is that correct?
1702:08.4	APP	Affirmative, taxi into the runway and -ah leave the runway third, third to your left, [background conversation in the tower].
1702:16.4	PA RT	Third to the left, O.K.
1702:18.4	PA CAM 3	Third he said.
	PA CAM ?	Three.
1702:20.6	APP	...ird one to your left.
1702:21.9	PA CAM 1	I think he said first.
1702:26.4	PA CAM 2	I'll ask him again.
	PA CAM ?	??
1702:32.2	PA CAM 2	Left turn.
1702:33.1	PA CAM 1	I don't think they have take-off minimums anywhere right now.
1702:39.2	PA CAM 1	What really happened over there today?
1702:41.6	PA CAM 4	They put a bomb in the terminal, Sir, right where the check-in counters are.
1702:46.6	PA CAM 1	Well we asked them if we could hold and -uh- I guess you got the word, we landed here ...
	CAM-?	??
1702:49.8	APP	KLM four eight zero five how many taxiway -ah- did you pass?
1702:55.6	KLM RT	I think we just passed Charlie four now.
1702:59.9	APP	O.K. ... at the end of the runway make one eighty and report -ah- ready -ah- for ATC clearance [background conversation in the tower].
1703:09.3	PA CAM 2	The first one is a ninety degree turn.
1703:11.0	PA CAM 1	Yeah, O.K.
1703:12.1	PA CAM 2	Must be the third ... I'll ask him again.
1703:14.2	PA CAM 1	O.K.
1703:16.6	PA CAM 1	We could probably go in it's ah ...
1703:19.1	PA CAM 1	You gotta make a ninety degree turn.
1703:21.6	PA CAM 1	Yeah, uh.
1703:21.6	PA CAM-2	Ninety degree turn to get around this ... this one down here it's a forty five.
1703:29.3	PA RT	Would you confirm that you want the clipper one seven three six to turn left at the third intersection?
1703:35.1	PA CAM 1	One, two.
1703:36.4	APP	The third one, sir, one; two, three, third, third one.
1703:38.3	PA CAM ?	One two (four).
1703:39.0	PA CAM 1	Good.
1703:40.1	PA CAM 1	That's what we need right, the third one.
1703:42.9	PA CAM 3	Uno, dos, tres.
1703:44.0	PA CAM 1	Uno, dos, tres.
1703:44.9	PA CAM 3	Tres - uh - si.
1703:46.5	PA CAM 1	Right.
1703:47.6	PA CAM 3	We'll make it yet.
1703:47.6	APP	...er seven one three six report leaving the runway.
1703:49.1	PA CAM 2	Wing flaps?
1703:50.2	PA CAM 1	Ten, indicate ten, leading edge lights are green.
1703:54.1	PA CAM ?	Get that.
1703:55.0	PA RT	Clipper one seven three six.
1703:56.5	PA CAM 2	Yaw damp and instrument?
1703:58.6	PA CAM 1	Ah- Bob we'll get a left one...
1703:59.3	PA CAM 2	I got a left.
1704:00.6	PA CAM 1	Did you?
1704.00.9	PA CAM 2	And -ah- need a right.
1704:02.6	PA CAM 1	I'll give you a little ...
1704:03.8	PA CAM 2	Put a little aileron in this thing.
1704:05.0	PA CAM 1	O.K., here's a left and I'll give you a right one right here.
1704:09.7	PA CAM 1	O.K. right turn right and left yaw.
1704:11.4	PA CAM 2	Left yaw checks.
1704:12.4	PA CAM 1	O.K., here's the rudders.
1704:13.6	PA CAM 1	Here's two left, centre, two right center.
1704:17.8	PA CAM 2	Checks.
1704:19.2	PA CAM 2	Controls.
1704:19.6	PA CAM 1	Haven't seen any yet!
1704:20.3	PA CAM 2	I haven't either.
1704:21. 7	PA CAM 1	They're free, the indicators are checked.
1704:24.6	PA CAM 2	There's one.
1704:25.8	PA CAM 1	There's one.
1704:26.4	PA CAM 1	That's the ninety degree.
1704:28.5	PA CAM ?	O.K.
1704:34.5	PA CAM ?	??
	PA CAM  2	Weight and balance finals?
1704:37.7	PA CAM	[Sounds similar to stabilizer trim]
1704:37.2	PA CAM 1	We were gonna put that on four and a half
1704:39.8	PA CAM 3	We got four and a half and we weigh five thirty four. [sound of stabilizer trim]
1704:44.6	PA CAM 2	Four and a half on the right.
1704:46.8	PA CAM 2	Engineer's taxi check.
1704:48.4	PA CAM 3	Taxi check is complete.
1704:50.5	PA CAM 2	Take-off and departure briefing?
1704:52.1	PA CAM 1	O.K., it'll be standard, we gonna go straight out there till we get thirty five hundred feet then we're gonna make that reversal and go back' out to ... fourteen.
1704:58.2	APP	...m eight seven zero five and clipper one seven ... three six, for your information, the center line lighting is out of service. [APP transmission is readable but slightly broken]
1705:05.8	KLM RT	I copied that.
1705:07.7	PA RT	Clipper one seven three six.
1705:09.6	PA CAM-1	We got center line markings ... only could be "don't we they count the same thing as ... we need eight hundred meters if you don't have that center line... I read that on the back of this just a while ago.
1705:22.0	PA CAM 1	That's two.
1705:23.5	PA CAM 3	Yeh, that's forty-five there.
1705:25.7	PA CAM 1	Yeh.
1705:26.5	PA CAM 2	That's this one right here.
1705:27.2	PA CAM 1	Yeh, I know.
1705:28.1	PA CAM 3	O.K.
1705:28.5	PA CAM 3	Next one is almost a forty-five, huh yeh.
1705:30.6	PA CAM 1	But it goes...
1705:32.4	PA CAM 1	Yeh, but it goes ... ahead, I think it's gonna put us on the taxiway.
1705:35.9	PA CAM 3	Yeah, just a little bit yeh.
1705:39.8	PA CAM ?	O.K., for sure.
1705:40.0	PA CAM 2	Maybe he, maybe he counts these, are three.
	PA CAM ?	Huh.
1705:44.8	PA CAM ?	I like this.
1705:44.8	KLM RT	Uh, the KLM ... four eight zero five is now ready for take-off ... uh and we're waiting for our ATC clearance.
1705:53.4	APP	KLM eight seven * zero five uh you are cleared to the Papa Beacon climb to and maintain flight level nine zero right turn after take-off proceed with heading zero four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR.
1706:09.6	KLM RT	Ah roger, sir, we're cleared to the Papa Beacon flight level nine zero, right turn out zero four zero until intercepting the three two five and we're now at take-off.
ca. 1706:13	KLM CAM 1	We're going
1706:18.19	APP	OK.
1706:19.3	PA RT	No .. eh.
1706:20.08	APP	Stand by for take-off, I will call you.
1706:20.3	PA RT	And we're still taxiing down the runway, the clipper one seven three six.
1706:19.39 - 1706:23.19		[PA radio transmission and APP communications caused a shrill noise in KLM cockpit - messages not heard by KLM crew]
1706:25.6	APP	Roger alpha one seven three six report when runway clear.
1706:29.6	PA RT	OK, we'll report when we're clear.
	APP	Thank you
	PA CAM 1	Lets get the hell out of here!
	PA CAM 2	Yeh, he's anxious isn't he.
	PA CAM 3	Yeh, after he held us up for half an hour.  Now he's in a rush.
1706:32.43	KLM CAM 3	Is he not clear then?
1706:34.1	KLM CAM 1	What do you say?
1706:34.15	KLM CAM ?	Yup.
1706:34.7	KLM CAM 3	Is he not clear that Pan American?
1706:35.7	KLM-1	Oh yes. [emphatically]
1706:40		[PanAm captain sees landing lights of KLM at approximately 700 meters]
	PA CAM 1	There he is .. look at him!  Goddamn that son-of-a-bitch is coming! Get off! Get off!  Get off!
1706:44		[KLM starts rotation]
1706:47.44	KLM CAM 1	[Scream]
1706:50		[Collision]

The Story :

Some 583 people died or were mortally injured on March 27th 1977 after two Boeing 747 jumbo jets collided on a runway at Los Rodeos airport, Tenerife, in the Canary Islands, making this the world's worst civil aviation disaster.

The Canary Islands are located in the Atlantic Ocean, off the Western coast of Africa, between 27 and 29 degrees north latitude, and between 13 and 18 degrees west longitude. They are volcanic islands. Tenerife is the archipelago's middle island and is 81 km long and 45 km wide.

The PanAm Boeing 747-121, on a charter passenger flight from Los Angeles to Las Palmas, had been in the air for eight hours. Some 396 people, including 16 crew, were onboard. Its captain was annoyed as he had not obtained clearance to land at Las Palmas. A bomb had exploded there two hours previously and the airport was closed for repair. The 747 was requested to divert to Tenerife, 70 km west of Las Palmas. The Captain and his passengers were unhappy about this arrangement, but they had no other choice.

At 14h15 GMT, PanAm flight 1736 made its final approach on runway 30. The landing at Los Rodeos airport (Tenerife) was a smooth one, but the captain noticed the larger than usual number of aircraft at the airport. Many aircraft, including a 747-206B from KLM, had landed there following the closure of Las Palmas airport. The small Tenerife airport was saturated.

The PanAm 747 was requested to park in fourth position, behind the KLM 747. The KLM aircraft was also a charter flight (KLM 4805). It had landed 45 minutes previously, with 248 people onboard, including 14 crew. Its captain was nervous: very strict Dutch regulation forbid the crew to exceed their quota of flying hours. Should the plane not take-off soon, its captain and KLM could be in serious trouble.

At 14h30 GMT, good news: the Tenerife control tower informed all grounded aircraft that Las Palmas airport had just re-opened. The controller informed the Panam Captain that in order to speed up take-off he could taxi right behind the KLM 747. The Panam captain agreed.

Photo copyright Stefan Sjogren - Airliners.net

The PanAm Boeing 747 involved in the crash

Weather deteriorated: a heavy fog would soon cover the airport. The visibility rapidly dropped to a few hundred meters (300 feet). At 16h51, the KLM 747 was cleared to start its engines. At 16h52, the Panam 747 requested clearance to start its engines. The control tower's answer was as follows:

16:52 (Tenerife control tower) - PanAm 1736, you are cleared to start. Report ready for taxi. For your information, you will have to backtrack behind the other 747 and leave the runway third taxiway to your left.

Both 747s would therefore backtrack the length of the 3,400-meter (11,000 feet) runway at low speed. The KLM aircraft would backtrack to the end of the runway, make a u-turn and report ready for take-off. The PanAm plane would exit the runway into the third taxiway in order to free the way for the KLM aircraft to take off. This was deemed the simplest solution in view of heavy traffic at the airport.

At 16h55, the Dutch 747 reached the runway, the American 747 a few hundred meters behind it. The fog was becoming denser: the 747s could not see each other, and neither aircraft could be seen from the control tower. The visibility was less than 200 meters.

Photo copyright Bill Sheridan - Airliners.net

The KLM Boeing 747 involved in the crash

17 :01 :57 (PanAm first officer) – Tenerife the Clipper one seven three six.

17 :02 :01 (Tenerife control tower) – Clipper one seven three six Tenerife.

17 :02 :03 (PanAm first officer) – Ah. We were instructed to contact you and also to taxi down the runway, is that correct?

17 :02 :08 (Tenerife control tower) – Affirmative, taxi into the runway and -ah leave the runway third, third to your left.

17 :02 :16 (PanAm first officer) – Third to the left, OK.

 Background conversation in the control tower made it difficult for the crew to hear the instructions.

17 :02 :18 (Mecanician) – Third he said?

17 :02 :19 (Captain) – Three?

17 :02 :21 (Tenerife control tower) – -ird one to your left.

17 :02 :22 (Captain) – I think he said first.

<17 :02 :26 (First officer) – I'll ask him again.

17 :02 :32 (First officer) – Left turn.

17 :02 :33 (Captain) – I don't think they have take-off minimums anywhere right now.

17 :02 :39 (Captain) – What really happened over there today?

17 :02 :41 (PanAm employee) – They put a bomb (in) the terminal, Sir, right where the check-in counters are.

17 :02 :46 (Captain) – Well we asked them if we could hold and -uh- I guess you got the word, we landed here.

The controller was next heard talking to the KLM jumbo crew.

17 :02 :50 (Tenerife control tower to KLM 747) – KLM four eight zero five how many taxiway -ah- did you pass?

17 :02 :55 (KLM 4805) – I think we just passed charlie four (fourth one) now.

17 :02 :59 (Tenerife control tower) – O.K. ... at the end of the runway make one eighty and report -ah- ready -ah- for ATC clearance.

Both aircraft were still backtracking down the runway, but the PanAm 747 was lost in the fog, the latter making it very difficult to spot the exit taxiways. The control tower had confirmed earlier that the aircraft must exit the runway into the third taxiway.

17 :03 :48 (Tenerife control tower) – ...er seven one three six report leaving the runway.

17 :04 :59 (Tenerife control tower) – -m eight seven zero five and clipper one seven ... three six, for your information, the centre line lighting is out of service.

This picture was taken at the Tenerife airport, a few minutes prior to the crash. It shows both 747 that will collide in a few minutes. Foreground, the KLM one. Background, the PanAm one.

Yet more bad news. In addition, the crew of the PanAm 747 had just passed the third taxiway without seeing it. They had seen the first one, missed the second one, and were now passing the third one thinking it was the second one. They were now headed for the fourth one.

Meanwhile, the Dutch 747 had finished backtracking the runway and was now making a u-turn. The fog dissipated slightly and the visibility increased to 700 meters. This was an opportunity that the KLM captain wasn't about to miss.

17 :05 :45 (First officer to the control tower) – Uh, the KLM ... four eight zero five is now ready for take-off ... uh and we're waiting for our ATC clearance.

17 :05 :53 (Tenerife control tower) – KLM eight seven zero five uh you are cleared to the Papa Beacon climb to and maintain flight level nine zero right turn after take-off proceed with heading zero four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR.

17 :06 :09 (KLM first officer) – Ah roger, sir, we're cleared to the Papa Beacon flight level nine zero, right turn out zero four zero until intercepting the three two five and we're now (at take-off ??).

The 747 obtained clearance, but was not allowed to take off as yet. However, its captain, in a hurry, started advancing the throttle, having forgotten that another aircraft was still taxiing down the runway. The stressful situation was probably to blame.

17 :06 :13 (Captain) : We gaan. (We're going)

17 :06 :19 (Tenerife control tower) : OK

The Panam first officer was talking simultaneously :

17 :06 :19 (PanAm first officer) : No .. eh...

The controller was struck by a sudden doubt. He reminded the KLM captain that he had not been cleared for take-off.

17 :06 :20 (Tenerife control tower) : Stand by for take-off, I will call you.

17 :06 :20 (PanAm first officer) : And we're still taxiing down the runway, the clipper one seven three six.

Paths of both 747

The last two messages were radioed simultaneously and were therefore heard as a long four-second high-pitched sound. The KLM 747 speed increased. Some 1,500 meters further on, the PanAm 747 was still taxiing down the runway.

17 :06 :25 (Tenerife control tower to the PanAm 747) - Roger alpha one seven three six report when runway clear

17 :06 :29 (PanAm first officer) - OK, we'll report when we're clear

17 :06 :30 (Tenerife control tower) - Thank you

The KLM captain did not react. He may have misunderstood and thought that the PanAm 747 had just cleared the runway.

17 :06 :32 (KLM first officer) – Is hij er niet af dan? {Is he not clear then?}

17 :06 :34 (KLM captain) – Wat zeg je? {What do you say?}

17 :06 :35 (KLM first officer) – EstIs hij er niet af, die Pan American? {Is he not clear that Pan American?}

17 :06 :36 (Angry KLM captain) – Jawel. {Oh yes. - Emphatic}

Areas where debris were found

Meanwhile, the PanAm jumbo jet reached the fourth taxiway. Suddenly, the PanAm captain spotted the landing lights of the KLM Boeing approximatively 700 meters away in the fog.

17 :06 :41 (PanAm captain) – (screaming) He’s coming… look… this son of b**** is coming

17 :06 :41 (PanAm first officer) - (screaming)

The PanAm crew set full throttle to leave the runway as quickly as possible, but it was too late. The KLM captain spotted the PanAm jumbo jet on the runway:

17 :06 :47 (KLM captain) – Oh shit

Computer-generated portrayal of collision between both Boeing 747

The speed of the Dutch 747 was over 270 km/h. The captain applied full back stick pressure in order to take off and fly over the other 747. The nose climbed, the tail struck the runway, producing sparks. The aircraft climbed one meter above ground, but this wasn't enough.

The 350-tonne giants collided. The forward landing gear wheels of the Dutch 747 struck the right side of the PanAm 747, tearing the fuselage. The left wing cut the vertical stabilizer at rudder level. Passengers saw partitions open, the ceiling disappear and the floor collapse. Right wing fuel tanks were torn apart and fuel started igniting.

The KLM 747 had risen slightly but it had become completely dislocated and it crashed. There were no survivors.

In the PanAm 747, a few people escaped from the burning plane. Some 64 people, including the captain and everybody on the flight deck, survived, out of 396. The heat produced by the fire cleared the fog one kilometer around the crash scene.

Some 583 people died in the crash. 64 people survived.

Photo of the Tenerife crash shot minutes after the disaster

   

Aircraft Crash Info

With the deepest sympathy for the missing ones,
Here, I provide the latest crash infos,
The most fatal one,
The secret from the ATC and CVR..

For all of us,
As a reminder..
That sky is a vast place..but there's no room for error..

Fairy